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Abstract
In this dissertation some novel indices for vulnera-bility and robustness assessment of power grids are
presented. Such indices are mainly defined from the
structure of transmission power grids, and with the aim
of Blackout (BO) prevention and mitigation. Numerical
experiments showing how they could be used alone or in
coordination with pre-existing ones to reduce the eﬀects
of BOs are discussed.
These indices are introduced inside 3 diﬀerent sub-
jects:
The first subject is for taking a look into economi-
cal aspects of grids’ operation and their eﬀects in BO
propagation. Basically, simulations support that: the
determination to operate the grid in the most profitable
way could produce an increase in the size or frequency of
BOs. Conversely, some uneconomical ways of supplying
energy are shown to be less aﬀected by BO phenomena.
In the second subject new topological indices are
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devised to address the question of "which are the best
buses to place distributed generation?".
The combined use of two indices, is shown as a promising
alternative for extracting grid’s significant features regard-
ing robustness against BOs and distributed generation.
For this purpose, a new index based on outage shift
factors is used along with a previously defined electric
centrality index.
The third subject is on Static Robustness Analysis of
electric networks, from a purely structural point of view.
A pair of existing topological indices, (namely degree index
and clustering coeﬃcient), are combined to show how
degradation of the network structure can be accelerated.
Blackout simulations were carried out using the DC
Power Flow Method and models of transmission networks
from the USA and Europe.
Dissertation Outline
In chapter 1, a description of power grids structure,
components and functioning is done, as well as some
explanation regarding their historical development, and
the BO problem. Models, and computational techniques
to simulate grid operation are commented.
In chapter 2, the problem of BO is addressed in more
detail, mentioning its causes and dynamics. Also, various
approaches to take rid of them are commented.
In chapter 3, a handful of indices and parameters
used in grid security assessment are reviewed, especially
in connection with BO evaluation and prevention. Some
comments on their strengths and weakness are done.
Dissertation Outline v
In chapter 4, Novel indices and ideas for BO reduction
are introduced, commenting motivations and expectations
considered for the corresponding definitions. Details of
models and simulations are explained.
Chapter 5 presents final comments for this thesis,
including discussions regarding the novel indices devel-
oped, mentioning applicability, enhancements and possi-
ble modifications.
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1 Introduction
Power grids are technological structures of majorimportance for modern society, providing a mean
for transportation of generated electrical energy towards
consumers. Since the time of first installed power grids,
sporadic failures has been observed in an almost random
pattern, leading to partial or complete lost of service
to consumers. Such malfunctioning conditions, along
with recovering time and economic losses was baptized
generically with the name Blackout (BO). With the passing
of time, power grids have evolved, increasing supplying
capacity, geographical extension and complexity, and BOs
went from simple and tiny inconveniences towards the
emergence of extensive cascading phenomenon. Some-
times such BOs reach very considerable size, having the
property of being unpredictable, even if a considerable
number of techniques and procedures have been devised
with the aim of mitigating their eﬀects. Also, a number of
indices and indicators for security and grid state assess-
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ment exist, each one more or less appropriate depending
the network under consideration, and showing variable
eﬀectiveness. Diﬀerent approaches to reduce BOs risk
are used, but in general no one is the definitive solution.
The quantity of proposed techniques is enormous, but as
economical consideration are to be taken into account
when talking about BO prevention and mitigation, just
a little portion of the total proposals are implemented in
practice. No technique is "free", and the gap between
theoretical correction and technical possibilities of im-
plementation could have a prohibitive cost. From an
engineering point of view, the main goal is to arrive at
practical but not expensive solutions, since power grids
are technological machinery with the clear economical
purpose of transporting and selling energy. Besides
that, it is understood that theoretical developments to
explain and bound BO and cascading phenomenon are
still necessary [1].
Despite the eﬀorts in reducing BO size and occurrence,
they are still a real somehow random problem, growing
more or less at the rate of growing of grids. A simple
extrapolation, would indicate that the future size of this
failures will make the problem at hand a real nightmare if
reliability of service is to be guaranteed to the costumers.
According to some researchers (e.g. [2]), the problem could
be even worse since the generalized lack of new trans-
mission lines and increment in transmission capacity
makes overloading a state more common to the everyday
functioning of grids. Also the very structure of the grid
is evolving in various ways. Not only the technological
advance in the major components is modifying constantly
the visible face of the machine; the functioning and
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coordination of all the parts is also having a strong
variation due to many causes, like for example:
• The desire of more automation, and realization of
smart grids.
• The communication structures to maintain the grid
working as a whole or to form, if desired, islands.
• The changing governmental rules to regulate and
promote the liberalization of the energy market,
introducing more and more stakeholders.
• The need to adapt grid operation procedures to those
changing legislations.
• The need to make space for the insertion of new
energy sources, and . . .
• The raising introduction of distributed generation.
All this forces of change should have with no doubt
an eﬀect on BO occurrence, an so, research on this topic
is well justified. As said before, theoretical research for
enhancing grid performance and reliability is being done,
and numerous merit figures and indices have been yet
developed. But, as final assessment and implementation
of new techniques is not an easy task, or even too
expensive, new ideas are always welcome.
Considering the relative delay in the construction of
new transmission lines to meet demand, or at least to
match the growing generation capacity [2], more research
regarding the fragility, or robustness, of the transmission
networks from a structural point of view is reasonable.
Besides this, the increasing addition of distributed gener-
ation (which normally have natural constraints regarding
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duty cycle but less problems to modify its geographical
location) brings to the discussion the question of where to
insert such generation units. Variations in the general
state of the grid’s load caused by new DG shall also
influence the occurrence of BOs. Therefore, trying to
discover and define technically objective figures of merit
and indices for the inclusion of DG, is also a matter of
interest, [3].
1.1 Power Grids
1.1.1 Mission and historical development
An electric power grid is the entire apparatus of wires
and machines that connects sources of electricity with
customers and their multiple needs [4]. From a historical
perspective, the electric power system evolved in the first
half of the 20th century without a clear awareness and
analysis of the system-wide implications of its evolution.
The role of electric power has grown steadily in both
scope and importance during this time, and electricity
is increasingly recognized as a key to societal progress
throughout the world, driving economic prosperity and
security and improving the quality of life. For example, in
the United States in 1940, 10% of the energy consumption
was in form of electricity; as time passed by the portion
of electricity vs. total energy consumed has risen up to
40 % nowadays. Electric grid now underlies every aspect
of our economy and society, and it have been considered
among the engineering innovation most beneficial to our
civilization. .
In the early days of power systems, generation and
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transportation of energy was done mainly in DC, being
AC systems of less extension. After a pair of decades of
development and discussion, AC generation and transport
conquer almost the totality of the market and infrastruc-
tures due to its easy conversion to diﬀerent voltage levels,
up and down, allowing relatively simple devices to manage
HV- low current from transmission lines, to supply low
voltage- moderate current for final users. DC systems
was reduced for almost a century to interconnecting
links between major AC systems, or for relatively small
and isolated regions. Such dispute between DC and
AC was resolved and implemented by conventions based
on practical convenience and technological limitations,
and although DC generation is starting to gain interest
because of the primordial DC power consumption of
electronics devices, the supremacy of AC is to be kept still
for a while.
With a rough similarity to the AC-DC evolution, an-
other trend involving power generation is happening now.
This time, the main character is power generation and
its connection to consumers. Disregarding whether the
generation was DC or AC, each one of the first systems
was always strongly related with a primal consumer. That
is: each generator was meant to serve a specific center
of consumption or population and, in principle, that
consumer was in the generator’s neighborhood. The next
step in grid’s growing came from the increasing size of con-
sumption and the settling of power plants in appropriate
but distant places. So, at that point the use of medium-
big longitude lines to connect generator and consumers
give the real born to the grid. Interconnections between
diﬀerent consumers and generators to provide alternative
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and backup paths to energy transportation conclude the
basic structure of electric grid as we know today. In this,
now mature scheme, most of generation is composed by
facilities of high size and normally geographically far from
consumers; this is called Concentrated Generation (CG),
diﬀerent of what was used in the early times of grids.
Power grids are still meanly composed of transmission
lines and concentrated generation centers, like hydro,
nuclear, coal, or fuel devices, more or less far from
the consumer points. This archetype, has lasted for
almost a century. Nowadays, the general grid’s scheme
is returning in some sense to the original settlement of
generator not so far away from consumers due to the
arrival and progressive introduction of renewal power
sources, characterized by having low to medium size
compared to concentrated centers. More importantly,
this type of power generation is normally in close vicinity
with consumers and normally have a lack of capability to
deliver power at a constant rate for a long period or, at any
hour of the day. This type of generation is basically called
Distributed Generation (DG). Even though there are many
definitions for it, depending on local regulations of each
country, this is roughly constituted by generation units of
limited size (around 10 MW or less) interconnected at the
substation, distribution feeder or customer load levels [5],
and often of private property [6]. DG technologies include
photovoltaics, wind turbines, fuel cells, small and micro
sized turbine packages, Stirling-engine based generators,
and internal combustion engine-generators. Actual DG is
strongly related with green power sources, and sometimes
confused with them. Power grids are changing in an
accelerate way, due to the insertion of DG, and the
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possibility of degradation in power quality, reliability, and
control due to this insertion should be minimized, [3].
The addition of new generation technologies, struc-
tural change involving operation, the establishment of
deregulation of electricity markets and the consequent
need to adapt the operation to the legal constraints,
and the struggle to make electrical systems increasingly
independent of human errors, results in the need for
a relatively profound change in the way the network
coordinate their operation. It is expected that these ma-
chines get suﬃcient "intelligence" to handle all the many
variables involved, reaching a stable and economically
convenient operation, as automatically as possible. The
latter because it is becoming increasingly clear that the
operation of the networks is somewhat restricted by the
limited number of variables that human operators can
manage, characterized by the ever present possibility of
accidental mistakes. The new paradigm in relation to the
intelligent operation of grids and its ability to adapt itself
to variable conditions has been coined as "Smart Grid".
Again, there are many definitions of this concept,
among which it is worth mentioning the following, which
cover most features to consider: "The Smart Grid can be
defined as an electric system that uses information, two-
way, cyber-secure communication technologies, and com-
putational intelligence in an integrated fashion across the
entire spectrum of the energy system from the generation
to the end points of consumption of the electricity", [7].
"Smart grid is envisioned to improve eﬃciency, reliability,
and flexibility of the current grid while reducing the rate
at which additional electric utility infrastructure needs to
be built", [8].
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It is expected that the grid should be smart enough
to avoid as much as possible BOs, or otherwise recover
promptly after such events. Anyway, BO prevention
methods previously designed need to be modified or tuned
up for a better match with the new energy policies and
technologies.
1.1.2 Grid’s Components
The electrical power system consists basically of the
following three parties:
• Consumers, who pay for energy to be used in
lighting, building conditioning, motors, industrial
processes, etc. Represent the loads.
• Energy sources, in the form of power plants, of
various types, sizes and fuels.
• Delivery system, whereby electric power is trans-
ported from the generators to the customers along
transmission lines. Without this lines the "grid"
would be inexistent.
Excluding the customers and their appliances, power
grids have a big variety of components. Those can be seen
at its time as belonging to one of three groups, namely:
i. Active elements for power generation and transfor-
mation;
ii. Maneuver elements, that makes possible the inter-
connection of other elements as well as the ability of
changing grid’s structure in order to redirect energy
through not overloaded lines, and...
1.1. Power Grids 9
iii. Protection elements, aimed to prevent overloading
and destruction of power handling elements.
Also, measuring and communication devices are indis-
pensable for grid operation, even if they are not directly
implied in power handling. For example, for flow calcula-
tion and estimation these devices do not normally require
explicit modeling, being somehow transparent from a
theoretical point of view. But in real life, these devices
can be target of malicious attacks almost as harmful
as direct destruction of power handling components.
Additionally, human beings, since their expertise can
produce significant diﬀerent results in case of emergency,
could also be still considered as grid components, [1].
1.1.3 Transmission and Distribution Sys-
tems
Electric grids have grown so as to have an intricate layout.
However since the goal of the network is the transmission
of energy from generating facilities to centers of consump-
tion, it is possible to distinguish two types of meshes
formed by the supply lines. The first group corresponds
to transmission networks that connect consumers and
(rather distant) generators; they work with the higher
voltages available and, have truly web structures. In
the second group are distribution networks, formed by
lines inside the population centers, connecting directly
to residential, commercial and industrial users. These
networks use lower voltages, from a few tens of kV, to
a minimum of 110 or 220 Volts. The major diﬀerence
between the two types of networks is in their topologic
10 Introduction
structure: distribution networks are almost always of
radial, and sometimes of loop shape; being the web
structure a quality of transmission networks. Distribution
networks have one, or few points for bulk energy input,
being the very first lines going out from the transforming
substation called as "feeders". From these points, low
voltage lines branch into a tree. Additionally, DG is placed
inside distribution networks, on branches of the struc-
ture. Another minor diﬀerence is that distribution lines
are increasingly of underground type, while transmission
lines are mostly of the overhead type.
Regarding operation, these two types of networks have
several diﬀerences. Distribution networks show more
variability in their structure, as consumer demands and
location within the area belonging to each "feeder" are con-
stantly changing, and then switching devices are operated
to adjust voltage levels and choose the best routes for
energy. Transmission networks are comparatively more
stable in their structure. Diﬀerences in operation due to
variability in structure and loads concentration, lead to
the fact that control algorithms, security previsions and
indices, etc. are also diﬀerent for one type of network or
the other one. This helps in understanding that since its
beginning "smart grids" development was focused on the
management of distribution networks; whereas today, the
challenge of making the Smart Grid a reality is somehow
the challenge to achieve an eﬃcient and reliable coordina-
tion between transmission and distributions systems.
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1.1.4 Present Changes and Trends
Up to not so long ago, network power flow were mainly
dominated by the production of concentrated generators,
being DG of supposedly minor relevance in what transmis-
sion power regards. But nowadays, the ascending share
of power delivered by distributed generators is becoming
of importance from the point of view of transmission,
since the modification on the power required by a feeder
may be appreciably modified by total variations of DG
power in a zone, [9]. Such influence is translated in
relatively strong variations in transmission lines power
flow, bringing the possibility of unexpected overloading on
those lines. In the history of power energy development it
was ever observed as matter of fact that any modification
to the system could produce an undesirable collateral
eﬀect. It is likely applicable also to the gradual increase of
DG penetration, which involves in principle more security,
reliability and resilience for the grid; but as suggested
in [9] some combinations of DG with CG have potential
for decreasing the grid’s performance against BO.
Stress on the current grid is expected to grow in the
short term due to lack of investment in new transmission
lines [2]. This is somehow a result of deregulation of the
electricity market, and the subsequent appearance on the
scene of energy and transportation providers in mutual
competition. It happens that the flow of energy through
the parts of the network is not subject to human decision
but to the laws of physics; and the construction of a new
transmission line is not just for the benefit of the builder
but also for all other networked stakeholders. These
two facts produce strong reduction of investment desire
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from competing parties in the electric market. Hence,
the relative lack of investment together with the constant
increment of consumption of about 2.4% annually [10],
suggest that the risk of BO will arise either due to the size
and frequency of the events.
1.2 The Problem of Blackouts
BO in power grids are big disturbances, generally oc-
curring in seasons of high energy consume, and rush
hours. May be, the most distinctive characteristics of
BO are not its sizes but, their unpredictable nature and
their progressive, fast, and diﬃcult to stop growth. An
isolated initial failure or malfunctioning equipment serves
as trigger to change others network components loading
state, which at their times also succumbs by overloading,
protection device improper triggering or sometimes a total
component destruction. A remarkable property of grids
with reference to BO is that as time went by even if a
rather big number of techniques have been developed
for preventing those failures, BO are still happening at
a sustained rate. Numerous revisions of historical data
and reports of blackouts, suggest that their number and
size is increasing, [11], [12].
From a technical standpoint BO are diﬃcult to treat
due to the complexity of the power grid. This complexity
of the electrical system leads to many of its features,
and the phenomena produced are qualitatively similar to
those observed in other complex systems, either artificial
or natural. Some examples of such systems are: the
www, networks of biochemical interactions, interactions
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between species. The phenomenon of BOs is usually
compared to epidemics, both in the way it can start and
develop and in the frequency and size of events. Also,
occurrence and sizes of BO driven in an especial way
by the increasing demand, give clues to categorize active
power grids as critically self-organized system, [13], [14].
In this regard, the influence of grid’s structure is easy
to suppose as very important, as has been indicated for
example in [15], [16], [17].
Cumulative probability distributions of BO’s sizes on
grids all around the world fits well with power laws. This
is considered as an indication of the complex nature of the
phenomena involved in the occurrence of BOs, [16], [18].
In figure 1.1 probability distributions of BO’s sizes
and aﬀected customers in USA for a time period of
about 20 years is reproduced from [19], showing the
aforementioned fit to power laws.
Each BO produces many inconveniences to people
aﬀected, but especially in form of direct and indirect
economic losses, often substantial, mainly from the pro-
ductive activities that are forced to stop due to lack of
energy. Breakage of some consumer-owned machines
also often do occur. The impact of a Blackout is greater
the longer it takes to restore energy supply, in a more than
linear fashion, being able to produce lack of water and
fuel provision, and the spread of diseases and vandalism,
[1], [19]. The BOs are capable of producing similar
damage to major natural disasters such as earthquakes
and hurricanes having a profound eﬀect on the lives of
people. It has been said [2] that BOs can be viewed
"as a disruption of social experience, as a military tactic,
as a crisis in the networked city, ... as the outcome of
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Figure 1.1: The cumulative probability distribution of blackout
sizes in customers (left, for events  500k customers) and MW
(right, for events  800 MW). X marks indicate blackout sizes
adjusted for population/demand growth. O marks indicate un-
scaled data. The lines show the power-law fit to the data.
(Extracted from [19]).
inconsistent political and economic decisions, and more".
BO are complex phenomena, and fighting them is not an
easy task; there is evidence of raise in size of big BO
as a consequence of prevention techniques designed to
manage little disturbances, [18].
1.2.1 BO Dynamics
As said above, BO happens normally in moments of high
consume, although being able to materialize without any
prerequisite. What is a constant behavior during a BO,
is the turning oﬀ of grid component, and the consequent
migration of power flow towards other zones of the grid,
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bringing to them additional threat of overloading.
While the failure of a single network element can
trigger a cascade of other elements, this situation rarely
occurs, due to security measures taken for the proper
functioning of the network [27]. One of such security
measures is called N   1 security rule, (see section 2.3),
which impose that the network must be able to withstand
the failure of any single element (generator, transformer,
transmission line) while avoiding the overloading of any
of the other elements of the network beyond its capacity.
This is why, in reality, most frequent BO start due to two
or more concurrent component faults.
After an initial event, (failure of one or more compo-
nents at the same time) two diﬀerent things can happen
to the power flow in the grid:
i. A steady-state progression, which is a slow suc-
cession of faults (overloading of line, transformers,
generators)
ii. Transient Progression, in fast succession: large
components going out of order due to under voltage
or under frequency conditions. The component start
a quick disconnection and, uncontrolled isolation of
important areas do occur feeding the BO.
It is assumed that BO progression could be stopped
in the stage of steady-state progression since time to take
corrective actions normally is suﬃcient enough; whereas
the possibilities of stopping a cascade failure during a
transient is strongly limited. Although this two processes
seem to be well diﬀerentiated, the more likely situation is
a superposition or alternation of both during a real BO.
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The location of the first (or compound) failure is un-
predictable, and its cause can come from many sources.
The subsequent elements going oﬀ are in principle
predictable using as a starting point the new loading state
of the grid, but there is also a stochastic ingredient in the
real outcome of a BO, due to the not total knowledge of
such state, measurement errors, and hidden failures in
protecting equipment, [1].
Something very important to notice is the fact that
cascading failures and BO are a side eﬀects of the existing
protection strategy [11]. This strategy is to de-energize
(switch oﬀ) each and every device that develops overstress,
such as exceedingly high or low currents or voltages.
A disturbance, such as a short circuit, often produces
overstress in the devices close to the disturbance. De-
energizing these devices eliminates these overstress, but
sometimes, the de-energizations produce overstress in
other parts of the network.
1.3 Modeling Techniques in Power
Grids
A key characteristic in grid’s power flow is the balance
between generated and consumed energy, but determin-
ing power flows on each line is not so simple to do.
Additionally, all currents and power flows should be below
the maximum capacities of the components, observing
acceptable margins for the sake of security and stability
of operation. No need to justify that knowing the grid’s
loading state is essential to control the system. As in
all other branches of technology, modeling real systems
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to explore its capabilities through computer simulations
is also a common practice for power networks. Suitable
models use and simulation can reveal features of systems
operation before construction or field test of new ideas.
In the case of power grids, it also serves to assist in
the determination of the sequence of events which could
have produced a BO. Calculation of loading state of major
elements in a grid is intensively used to identify, in
advance, risky situations in case of some selected possible
failures; or to determine the eﬀect of a control action
before its implementation on the hardware. As for all
physical systems, for networks there is not a perfect
model nor is there a unique way to do it. This happens
for several reasons, among which it is always present
the limited accuracy of measurements, and in the case
of networks there is additionally its strong complexity.
Detailed information of the huge number of devices is
never available. Thus, a significant degree of inaccuracy
exists whenever simulated values and measured ones are
compared for a real network.
In the next sections the most common models and
methods for calculating grid state are gazed, and the one
chosen to use in this thesis is discussed in more detail.
1.3.1 Graphs
To represent the structure of power grids, one of the most
used tools are undirected graphs, sometimes weighted
and sometimes unweighted. The buses and lines of the
grid, are the nodes and edges of the graph respectively.
The quality of "undirected" is for taking account of the
capability of power flow to come and go in both directions
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along lines. Unweighted graphs are useful when only
the connections between buses and lines are to be
represented; and weighted graphs are used when also the
impedance of lines is desired to take part into calculations.
Graphs are summarily useful to represent the connections
of networks as specific data structures, facilitating search
and ordering of components, paths between them, and
the calculation of many indices and figures of merit.
1.3.2 Power grids from the point of view of
complex systems
Although the study of power grids could seem to be just a
matter of modeling an equivalent network, the size of real
grids aside the variety of diﬀerent components interacting
and, the inexact knowledge of their states, lead to the
inability to control such systems as desired. Nonlinear
eﬀects and strong enough stochastic changes are always
present and despite the technical eﬀorts for simplifying the
operation of grids, these technological structures manifest
their quality of being very complex systems.
Power grids have been explored in that frame, and
compared whit other complex systems either real or
theoretical on the search for clues to understand in a
better way the phenomena developed inside them [21],
[22], [23], [24], [17]. This type of research concentrates
mostly on qualitative aspects, both of system constitution
and functioning, since detailed quantitative knowledge of
individual components is not accessible.
Some of the properties that are considered important
in the field of complex networks are for example: the
growth of the system itself; the spread of information
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or other flow through the network; where do bottle-
necks occur?, and what are its eﬀects?; when do critical
conditions happen before rupture or avalanches?; how
does network disintegration happen?. Talking about
power grids, this would correspond to the phenomena of
cascading failures and BO; island formation; and when do
network saturation occur?.
1.3.3 Electric Grid, and Power Flow Calcu-
lation Models
Flow of power in each network element is the most
important aspect of what is called "the state" of the grid.
So, various method for calculation and approximation of
power flow have been developed.
The most important variables to be calculated in
power grids, are those for any electric AC circuit: voltage
and phase at each node, and currents flowing through
lines (branches). As input data, what is required is the
structure of the grid, the power supplied or consumed in
each node, and the impedances connected between nodes,
that is: the line impedances through which electricity
is delivered; and additionally, the impedances from each
node to ground.
Basic definition of variables for considering buses,
lines and other devices of the grid are needed by power
flow calculation methods. Here such considerations are:
In each grid there are N nodes. The i-th node (i = 1, . . . , N )
is characterized en general by a power Pi . Also each node
has a voltage magnitude jEi j and phase i . Between nodes
we have K transmission lines. The k-th (k = 1,2, . . . , K)
20 Introduction
line transfers power from its two connecting buses, which
can be nominated a(k) and b(k) with a(k) , b(k) =
1, . . . , N .
The most common methods for power flow calculation
are Gauss-Seidel, Newton-Raphson, Decoupled and, DC;
being this last one the used thoroughly in this thesis.
Major characteristics of mentioned method are explained
in the following sections, (also in [46] and appendix A).
The Gauss-Seidel power flow method
In this method the voltages at each bus, Ei can be solved
iteratively starting from an initial guess. The iteration
equation in this case is of the form:
En+1i = F1(En+1y ) + F2(Enz ), with i 2 [1,N], including all
nodes with y < i and z > i.
F1 and F2 are multivariable functions having as argu-
ments the voltages on every bus. (Details of F1 and F2
expressions can be found in appendix A and in [46]).
The Gauss-Seidel method was the first AC power-flow
method developed for solution on digital computers. This
method is characteristically long in solving due to its
slow convergence and, often diﬃculty is experienced with
unusual network conditions such as negative reactance
branches. Iterations are executed until the diﬀerence
En+1i   Eni is below an specified value or the number of
iterations exceeds a maximum.
One of the disadvantages of the Gauss-Seidel method
lies in the fact that each bus is treated independently.
Each correction to one bus requires subsequent correction
to all the buses to which it is connected. The next methods
have better performance in this regard.
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The Newton-Raphson method
The Newton-Raphson method is based on the idea of
calculating the corrections of each Ei while taking ac-
count of all the interactions. The voltages of nodes are
considered in polar coordinates, producing two sets of
expressions, namely one for jEi j and another for i . As
Gauss-Seidel does, Newton-Raphson method starts from
an initial guess of jEi j and i and seek for the approximate
amount (jEi j and i ) to correct the initial values. This is
done using the function relating power at nodes (Pi + jQi )
with voltages and phases (jEi j, i ), and the Jacobian of
such function. (Derivation of the Jacobian can be seen on
appendix A).
The important expressions used for iteration are:26666666666666666666666666664
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using this last one (1.2), the values of jEj and 
are updated after each iteration until diﬀerence with
respect to the previous estimation is below an specified
value, or the number of iterations exceeds a maximum.
Solving for  and jEj requires the solution of a set of
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linear equations whose coeﬃcients make up the Jacobian
matrix, The Jacobian matrix must be also recalculated
at each iteration, but generally it has only a few percent
of its entries that are nonzero. So programs that solve
an AC power flow using the Newton-Raphson method are
successful because they take advantage of the Jacobian’s
"sparsity". The solution procedure uses Gaussian elimi-
nation on the Jacobian matrix and does not calculate J 1
explicitly.
Convergence of Newton-Raphson method is quadratic,
well better than the corresponding to Gauss-Seidel. Newton-
Raphsonmethod is called "full Newton" power flowmethod,
since produces the most accurate results. Also, the
robustness of its convergence is better than in other
iterative methods.
The Decoupled method
The Newton-Raphson method is the most robust power
flow algorithm used in practice. However, one drawback
to its use is the fact that the terms in the Jacobian
matrix must be recalculated each iteration, and then the
entire set of linear equations must also be resolved each
iteration. Since thousands of complete power flows are
often run for a planning or operations study, ways to
speed up this process were sought. Decoupled method
consist in a simplification of the Newton-Raphson method
in order to avoid the burden of solving and inverting
the Jacobian matrix at each iteration. Among others
(derived as explained in appendix A), the most important
simplifications are:
Let cos(i   k)  1.
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Assume rik << xik.
Such simplifications lead to two set of equations, in
which the matrices B0 and B00 are constant, and therefore
diminish the total computational burden:2666666666666664
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These two expression are solved iteratively, but con-
trary to Newton-Raphson method, each set of variables is
updated independently from the other one.
DC power flow
This is the method used in chapter 4. A further simplifi-
cation of the decoupled power flow algorithm can be done
simply dropping the Q-V equation (in 1.3) altogether. This
results in a completely linear, non-iterative, power flow
algorithm. To carry this out, we simply assume that all
jEi j = 1.0 per unit. Then eq. 1.3 becomes:2666666666666664
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The DC power flow is only good for calculating MW flows
on transmission lines and transformers. It gives no
indication of what happens to voltage magnitudes, or
MVAR or MVA flows. The power flowing on each line using
the DC power flow is then:
Pik =
1
xik
(i   k)
Next, some details used here for the construction of
expression 1.4 and in simulations of chapter 4.
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Additionally to the generic power Pi present on each bus,
in this thesis it has been useful making a distinction
among buses with power supplies and buses acting as
loads: these powers were nominated as Gi , and by Li
respectively. Nodes are such that GiLi = 0 for any
i = 1, . . . , N so that we may distinguish I input nodes
that are generators since Gi > 0 and Li = 0, J load nodes
such that Gi = 0 and Li > 0, and T = N I J transmission
nodes in which Gi = Li = 0.
Each line has a series resistance Rk and a series
reactance Xk, for which we assume Xk  Rk so that the
latter can be neglected.
Phase diﬀerence between nodes are supposed small
enough in order to maintain steady state stability; this
allows the approximation of sine function of angles by
their argument. Each line is also characterized by a
flow capacity, that in terms of voltage stability can be
considered around Ck < 12Xk [25]. All variables are
expressed in the per unit system (P.U. system), and so
can be managed as dimensionless quantities.
By defining an N-dimensional net power vector P with
entries Pi = Gi   Li for i = 1, . . . , N , an N-dimensional
vector  whose i-th entry is the phase at the i-th node
and the N  N matrix Y containing the imaginary part of
the admittance matrix of grid’s equivalent circuit we have:
Something to notice is that the set of N equations is
redundant leading to a singular system. The entries of P
sum up to zero and the phases are relative quantities;
hence, it is common to set, for example, N = 0 and
discard the last entry of P to obtain an invertible linear
relationship between the vector of net power and the
phases. In this way node N is taken as reference (or slack
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node), and phases and powers of the remainder nodes are
linearly related by an invertible matrix, as expressed by
1.4
P = Y (1.5)
(Matrix Y basically contains the same information as B0
in equation 1.4) If bus power are known, node phases
calculation can be done by inversion of equation 1.5:
 = Y  1P (1.6)
Power Fk flowing through the k-th line depends on line
impedance and relative phase between nodes:
Fk =
 
a(k)   b(k) /Xk
This relation can be expressed in matrix form, since
phases can be sought as linear combinations of bus
powers, according to the relation 1.6. Such linear relation
could be expressed as in equation 1.7:
F = MP (1.7)
This last one is intensively used in chapter 4, due
to its easy to insertion in linear programming problem
solutions. Something interesting to note is that M = fHg
is the matrix of shift factors (called also power transfer
distribution factors) referred to the slack bus of the
network. (Shift factors are used in section 4.2.6).

Chapter
2 Power Grid Security
and BO Mitigation
Techniques
In this chapter the most common causes of BO arediscussed, and some the techniques an control actions
used to reduce their number or their eﬀects are revised.
Interest in this thesis focuses on the transmission net-
works, so overloads and breaks in lines are major faults
which will be discussed hereafter. Failures in generators
or transformers are taken into consideration through
its equivalent eﬀect on the total power supplied to the
corresponding node of the network.
As said before, a BO can start from a sudden or
slow change in loading state, which could lead to the
triggering of protection elements or, start from an isolate
component’s failure. Destruction of active components
can be produced by meteorological phenomenon, or mere
malfunctioning of protection elements. Also failures or
destruction can be produced by intentional attacks, a
possibility that has produced generalized worry in last
years.
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BO propagates over a network putting out of order
its components, either by the triggering of protection
elements or by simple destruction of the less fortunate
ones. In almost all cases the propagation is mainly due
to protection relay action, responding to local overloading
conditions. Cascading failures and BO are a side eﬀects
of the existing protection strategy [11].
In the search of BO prevention and mitigation, actions
normally concentrates in the appropriate disconnection
of components in order to decrease overloading, even
if some consumers have to be leaved without service.
So BO prevention techniques work mainly to operate
properly maneuver elements and modify the power deliv-
ery scheduling, and loading. It is increasingly diﬃcult
to make the grid full time safe, because insertion and
removal of generation and loading conditions do not last
for more than 1 hour in a year [25]. Additionally growing of
the grid also increase its loading state variability. Discon-
necting nodes and lines after the initial failure can reduce
the spread of blackouts [26], but as a collateral eﬀect, in
some cases, fighting small blackouts can increment the
likelihood of larger blackouts [18].
The benefits of each Bo fighting technique is not easy
to evaluate. This diﬃculty in assessing such preventing
techniques comes from the fact that a technical field test is
impossible from a practical standpoint. Even considering
the margin of error in the values of the involved analogue
variables, each state of loading lasts for a little time, and
is basically not repeated again, due to the large number
of elements involved.
Besides this, there exist the additional diﬃculty of the
time scale in which real BO occur. This leads again to
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the conclusion that almost the only reasonable way of
research against the BO problem is through computer
simulations.
Another alternative is to use information of past
blackouts, to inquire into the causes and development
thereof. One approach is trying to find statistically what
of the grid’s states bring out the strengths or weaknesses
of the system. Again in this approach, there is always the
problem of lack of data, since monitoring and recording
all desired variables it is not possible. The sequence
in which past events occurred is often unknown until
the information from various sources is contrasted, (each
diﬀerent area operator must provide data coming from his
control area). Such is the case after each moderate size
BO, being required a considerable amount of "forensic"
analysis over the information available to finally establish
the causes and the full extent of the failure. In eﬀect, such
analysis can take months of work.
2.1 Generation and load Modifica-
tions
Changing load conditions can be used as a corrective or
preventive measure against most cases of overloading in
grid lines. Once a threatening network state is detected,
preventive action is exerted trying to drive the energy
through the less loaded lines in the network. Such
modifications can be achieved with a handful of actions,
implying ascending degree of adjustment in the following
order:
i. A variation in the power injected by some of the
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generators connected to the network.
ii. Decrease the amount of power consumed by cus-
tomers.
iii. Modification in the structure of the network, by
operating switches. This type of action can be used
to add or remove line, generators, consumers, or to
add energy transmission paths in the network.
This actions are carried out in some diﬀerent ways, but in
general terms have received the following names:
2.1.1 Power rescheduling
In the electricity market, the power to be provided by each
centralized generator is programmed in advance (which
may be a couple of weeks, days, or hours depending on
the power scale in play), usually under the supervision of a
state agency to ensure transparency and market freedom
with respects to the prices paid by energy. Modifying the
pre-arranged power to be supplied by generators, is called
rescheduling. The state of loading in the lines changes
naturally, but the goal is to get an overall less stressed
state.
This rescheduling, or redispatch, of the energy that
each generator shall provide at a future time can be
performed, for example, using the model of DC Power
Flow, described in section 1.3.3, and is used in this thesis
in chapter 4.
Since the energy demanded by users is constantly
changing, (as well as the power delivered by some renew-
able sources like wind and solar), during normal operation
of the network, i.e. without overload, the fine tuning of
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the total power delivered by each generator is dynamically
adjusted by automatic control systems, and commands
from the control centers.
In large grids, which are divided into various con-
trol areas, each one run by an independent operator,
rescheduling actions are also done by area operators,
but only directly within their assigned area. Necessary
adjustments on grid’s nodes corresponding to neighboring
areas (belonging to another operator), is done through
coordination messages or requests to operators of the
other areas. Such requests are meant to modify the
amount of energy leaving or entering through the frontier
lines that interconnect the involved areas.
Rescheduling is possible, even after a sudden change,
only if the system is in a reasonable stable and static
state. Although a basic control system can drive the
system to reach a balance in which no line capacity is
overwhelmed, rescheduling is inserted as part of a more
elaborate control system to reach amore secure operation.
The time between two credible failures and the need to
make a re-dispatch is not normally a problem. That
is, after the first credible failure there is little chance of
another failure before reallocating power. On the other
hand, it has been seen from past cascaded failures, that
in a big number of cases, (73.5%, [20]), a first accidental
failure was followed by a malfunctioning of a protection
device, i.e. a hidden failure. That’s why even using the
n-1 security rule (see section 2.3), BOs can emerge in a
"more than expected" rate [27]. More details regarding N-
k security rules and contingency analysis is discussed in
section 2.3. (Rescheduling of power is used in chapter 4
section 4.1.1) .
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2.1.2 Load shedding
A clear definition of what load shedding is, was Given
in [28] as follows: "This emergency measure involves the
deliberate interruption of selected, least critical load in an
attempt to avoid the interruption of all load on a system
as a consequence of excessive decay in system frequency
following a breakup of an interconnected transmission
network. Load shedding may be done manually, under
the monitoring of an operator, or automatically, initiated
by under frequency relays. In either case, the amount and
location of load to be interrupted to meet an emergency
situationmust be analyzed before the fact in order to judge
its eﬀectiveness and to assess its impact on transmission
line loadings. The basic criterion should be the avoidance
of further loss of generation or transmission. On some
systems, voltage reduction without disconnection of load
current may be a practical expedient for securing relief.
Load shedding, properly applied, can be a prudent emer-
gency measure in maintaining overall system reliability for
those systems which are characterized by high concentra-
tions of load and generation, e.g. compact metropolitan
systems, and for systems relatively isolated or remote
from other systems and having limited interconnection
capability relative to their load. Load shedding on a
region-wide basis should be applied only after intensive
study by individual systems, recognizing in each instance
the particular generation-transmission configuration and
the degree of interconnection. If introduced without
suﬃcient study and analysis, it can become a hazard
rather than a remedy since excessive load shedding within
a given area can result for some instances in an over speed
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or overload of generators and loss of transmission circuits,
thus further contributing to the system disturbance".
In particular, the reduction in voltage as load shed-
ding method is rarely used in most developed countries
because it involves a violation of quality standards. In
countries with less rigorous standards it is a common and
eﬀective practice.
When load shedding is carried out following cyclic
schedule is called a rolling blackout. An alternative
for prevention BO closely related to this technique is
"greenout", which consists in the voluntary disconnection
of some users to reduce the overall demand.
In case of a BO in development, current methods for
connection-disconnection of equipment, power shed, etc.,
rely on the capacities of local lines to support more or less
load, and in the available information about the state grid.
Meanwhile the BO is still happening, having an influence
on the entire physical grid, beyond the usual limit of any
area control. So, local forecast can do little about large
scale BO, since this phenomenon implies long distance
eﬀects and state influence.
2.2 On-line and oﬀ-line BO foresee-
ing
In BO prevention, collecting and classification of "prob-
lematic cases" is a way to be aware in advance of
dangerous states. This collection of clues can be done
by means of statistics on past events, or by simulation of
possible future states taking as starting point the present
grid conditions. The statistical approach is more suited
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for traditionally trained human experts, while the "on-line
prediction" via simulation, is the modern trend, (see next
section). Depending on the size of the grid considered, the
last approach, could need significant processing power,
but it is the natural way to avoid accidental human errors,
get standardization in grid behavior, and run assessment
techniques in a systematic and documentable way.
2.3 Contingency Analysis (CA)
Real time power grid operations heavily rely on computer
simulation. A key function in the energy management
system is contingency analysis, which assesses the ability
of the power grid to sustain various combinations of
power grid component failures based on state estimates.
The outputs of contingency analysis, together with other
energy management functions, provide the basis for
operation, preventive and corrective actions. Contin-
gency analysis is also extensively used in power market
operation for feasibility test of market solutions, [29].
Contingency analysis uses the current state reported by
SCADA systems to identify possible series of component
failures and check for collapse cases. The CA schemes
are usually referred to as (N   x) CA, where N is the total
number of components (could be lines, generators and
transformers) in the grid under consideration and x is the
level or order of the analysis. N x CA represents checking
all possible permutations of x or less components (out
of the total N) for a collapse. For example, a N   5 CA
would evaluate all possible combinations of up to five
components failing together in a cascade. As the number
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of components N and number of levels x increase, the
number of possible combinations that need to be evalu-
ated increases exponentially. Due to this computational
complexity, contingency analysis has been traditionally
limited to selected N   1 levels, exploring only the "most
credible" possible failures. However, post event analysis
of major blackouts has shown that failing of a component
leads to additional component outages in its vicinity, [12].
If a grid passes a N   1 contingency analysis, it is said to
be "N   1 secure". The type of CA described here, have
been developed for its use in power grids; furthermore,
a simpler type of contingency analysis can be applied for
complex networks of any type in order to grasp general
robustness thereof. In section 4.3 one novel variation of
such analysis is presented.
2.4 Successful methods?
While all methods to prevent or combat BO are forced to
use some of the actions described in the previous section,
the variety of proposed algorithms in use is quite big.
How to implement the best network protection is the big
unanswered question by now. There are many diﬀerences
in the way in which the authorities in each country do
introduce constraints to the operation of their networks;
and probably the same control algorithm could eventu-
ally show mismatching results when tested on diﬀerent
networks. Reaching a conclusion of how good a control
technique is from the point of view of BO prevention, is
also hard because the sporadic nature of BOs. No matter
the prevention method or control algorithm employed, it
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is impossible to estimate whether the next BO will be
greater or smaller than the last one. Anyway, because
the problem itself is complex and diﬃcult to attack in
a deterministic way, the algorithms preventing faults
are intensively incorporating computational intelligence
techniques, to exploit diﬀerent sources of information
available at a time. Thus, the statistics from past
failures, actual measurement data and predictions from
simulations are used for determining whether the network
is in a risky state or not. Some of the paradigms by which
intense research is trying to implement state predictors
and alerts are, for example, neural networks, genetic
algorithms, particle swarm algorithms, intelligent agents
and ant colony optimization, [30].
Anyway, the behavior of any controller using some
of those techniques can be quite poor if they are not
fed with features containing relevant information about
the phenomenon of interest. Try to find indices, as
discussed in this thesis to better understand the operation
of the grid, and to be used as input features to those
computational intelligence techniques, remains extremely
valuable.
Chapter
3 Security, robustness,
reliability indices and
parameters
We can talk about indices of safety, robustness, orreliability when we have objective quantities by
which it is possible to assess or predict in some extent the
performance of the grid in relation to some phenomena
(as BO or any other), or in relation to any type of test.
Regarding this thesis, the focus is on BOs and indices
that could be used automatically for control or planning
algorithms to achieve better performances from the grid
against those events.
In this chapter, I briefly review some of the indices so
far more used to determine robustness and reliability of
networks. I also mention some indices that have been
defined to measure in some grade the extension or size of
BO phenomena, but independently of any specific index
regarding the state or components of a grid.
As first thought, it would be expected for an index
to be a scalar quantity, but because of the number of
variables involved and the complexity of power grids, the
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potential of vector quantities as usefulness indices can not
be discarded. In our case, confronting the BO problem,
what we are interested to get are ways of showing:
• If the network is more or less at risk of a cascading
failure .
• If is it possible to achieve grid operation with fewer
BOs.
• If is it possible to get a reduction in the size of BOs.
One thing to note is that to define indices for more
realistic situations, it is necessary to use more variables
and data about the grid components involved. Naturally,
the potential usefulness of an index is also increasingly
limited to particular situations, and sometimes evaluating
their performance has an increased diﬃculty.
Next, some of the indices that have been used in
research and assessment on power networks are com-
mented.
3.1 Structural or Topological Indices
Purely structural indices, which take into account the
network topology, are relatively simple when compared
with those which try to consider the electrical quality of
power grids. Structural indices are strongly based on the
information that can be obtained from the corresponding
network graph, [31]. The firsts of this group normally
employed, have the particularity of being fairly generic,
and as a rule of thumb were designed within the scope
of study of complex networks. The idea of these indices
is to capture universal features of systems as networks
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made up of smaller components. They share their relative
simplicity, and its usefulness as a tool for comparing
systems of diﬀerent nature.
3.1.1 Degree Index
This is the simplest of the topological indices in use. It is
referenced to a node of the network, and consists in the
quantity of other nodes connected to the reference one.
Degree index is the number of neighbors a node has.
May be more important than the degree of each
node is the probability distribution of all degrees in a
network. Such distributions has been found useful for
comparing various networks. It can even show similarities
in networks of diﬀerent nature and diﬀerences in networks
of the same type. For example distributions of degree
coeﬃcient following a power law are normally found in
some complex networks (as in metabolic networks, WWW,
actor and scientific collaborations):
P(k) = a kγpw .
Other common degree index distributions found in com-
plex networks are, random and Poisson. Power law,
exponential and intermediate distributions of these two
are the most common found. For electric power grids the
distribution is usually an exponential function [32] :
Pcumexp(k) = C e k/γexp . (With k being the degree
coeﬃcient; a, C and both γ ’s constants).
The average node degree is also a valuable index when
comparing networks. In the case of power transmission
grids, the mean value of degree coeﬃcient is around 1.5.
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3.1.2 Network Diameter
The diameter of a network (and its associated graph) is
the maximal distance between any pair of its nodes [33].
In the case of power grids, distance between nodes have
been considered as simply the minimum number of lines
between two nodes. Also, more tuned to the electrical
quality of power grids, the impedance of such chain of
lines have been considered as a measure of distance.
Other combinations of electrical properties of components
have been used also to define distances and diameters.
3.1.3 Clustering Coeﬃcient
Clustering coeﬃcient is a measure of how much a group
of node is forming a clique around an element. Nodes
having high values for this coeﬃcient tend to operate in
"synchrony" as an unique element. The definition of this
coeﬃcient is [34]:
Ci =
2Ei
ki (ki 1) . Where Ci is the clustering coeﬃcient of
node i, ki its degree coeﬃcient, and Ei is the number of
edges or connections among the existent k nodes sur-
rounding i. This coeﬃcient in combination with diameter,
is capable of bringing in light some properties of networks
as for example the grade of similarity with "small world
networks" or with "random networks" as described in
[34]. Other simple combinations of topological coeﬃcients
could also be interesting and beneficial to extract or
represent important features of networks, and used as
a kind of vector indices. In this thesis, combinations of
two indices are explored in chapter 4, one of such pairs
including the clustering coeﬃcient.
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3.1.4 Centrality and Betweenness Central-
ity Coeﬃcients
Centrality coeﬃcients try to capture the importance or
relevance of an element in a network in relation to the
others, without regarding whether they are near or far.
These coeﬃcients have been defined as a way to capture
how influent and connected to the remaining of the
network a reference element can be. Also how much the
connection between other elements is dependent on the
reference element.
The idea was originally developed to indicate, in social
networks, which are the most influential people. Someone
who is known by many other people, for example, can
help a new network integrant to connect easily with other
people. That is to say, the new member can form more
bonds with others if he first connects with someone who
is already strongly connected to the rest of the network.
The simplest measure of centrality in the sense of
connection strength to the network that can be adopted is
the degree coeﬃcient, but this is a highly local measure,
taking into consideration only the very near elements to
the reference one. As centrality is a concept trying to cap-
ture also distant influences, the distance to far elements
of the network are normally taken into consideration for
definition of centrality indices. To act as a relevant link
between two others, the reference element is supposed to
be in a point inside the minimum length path between the
other two.
One of the most interesting centrality coeﬃcient de-
vised is the Betweenness Centrality (BC). This is defined
as the ratio of the number of minimal paths passing
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through the reference element and connecting any pair
of other elements, over the total number of minimal paths
connecting the pairs of elements [35], [36]. BC can be
defined for any type of element in a graph, i.e. nodes or
edges, being the definition for nodes as follows:
BC(v) =
X
s,v,tϸV
σst(v)
σst
(3.1)
That is, the "betweenness centrality of node v", (where
σst(v) is the number of minimal length paths between two
generic nodes s and t, and going through the node v; and
σst is total number of minimal paths connecting nodes s
and t).
This definition only takes into account the structure
of the graph corresponding to a network; however this
measure of centrality has been found to be very represen-
tative of the importance of nodes in some real networks,
as network data transmission systems. Anyway, for other
types of networks it is not so useful. To be used in power
grid research many other centrality indices have been
defined by diﬀerent research groups.
Some of those centrality coeﬃcients are for example:
Eigenvector Centrality, Closeness Centrality, Electrical
Degree Centrality defined as in [37], centrality delta [38],
and many more.
In this thesis, a coeﬃcient of electrical betweenness, is
presented in Chapter 4 whose definition takes into consid-
eration several characteristics of the electrical network.
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3.2 Indices for BO assessment
Besides those already mentioned, there is a huge amount
of research that have linked topological and electrical
betweenness indices to BOs. As a general rule, what is
sought are quantities showing influence on the behavior of
grids against cascading failures. In general such studies
serve to get an idea of the weakest and the strongest points
on a network, obtained by extrapolating the relationship
between BO and such indices. Also, threatening loading
states has been related to betweenness. Any index capa-
ble of highlight strengths or weaknesses in the network
is worth to be considered for further development. The
most used way of working in this field (BO on power grids)
is to define an index and then cause cascading failures
in modeled power grid; subsequently measurement of the
size or amount of failure are collected, and relations with
the defined index under test are established if possible.
This performance evaluation of network and at the
same time of the proposed indices also requires many
times the use of a more or less original way to measure
and expressing the results. This fact can be seen as a way
of defining indices, which are able of putting in evidence
information contained in the results of simulations. In
this sense, for example, probability distributions made
with data from BO (simulated or not) can be considered
as useful standard indices.
The following section will briefly discuss some of these
indices intended as gauges to measure the response of a
network against BO. In chapter 4 some alternative ways
to show the performance of a grid in reference to BO are
shown.
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3.2.1 Some assessment indices
Many indexes to measure the reliability of a grid against
service failures and BO have been proposed, some of the
simplest are for take into account the result of:
• Measurements of the frequency or duration of short
service interruptions.
• Measurements of the frequency or duration of long
service interruptions.
• Measurements of frequency and depth of voltage
drops
As examples of these types of indexes are some of the
mentioned in the recommendation IEEE 1366 [39], which
is a guide that can be useful in some cases, and can vary
in its use when working with diﬀerent grids.
Indices for sustained interruptions:
• SAIFI: system average interruption frequency index.
• SADI: average duration index system .
• CAIDI: Customer average interruption duration in-
dex.
These indices are meant to show how robust was the
network behavior, in normal operation or after a test.
In case a new technique or control algorithm should be
tested, it is assumed that these indices can be used
to make a comparison with performance obtained from
previous algorithms.
Chapter
4 ORIGINAL INDICES
This chapter consists of 3 main parts focusing ondiﬀerent approaches searching new clues about how
to improve the performance of power grids against BOs,
namely: "Economical Dispatch and BOs", "Distributed
Generation and BOs" and "Combined Indices for Static
Contingency Analysis".
Justifications and results of three corresponding groups of
experiments carried out on transmission network models
are displayed.
Summarily, any original idea of this thesis is contained
and developed in this chapter.
4.1 Economical Dispatch and BOs
In the market of electric energy, the operation of power
grids in the most economical way is a major objective, i.e.
producing and transporting energy at the minimum possi-
ble cost [40]. At the same time security and environmental
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regulations must be fulfilled, and compromises between
economic operation and technical limits of grids must be
addressed.
Seeking for the most economical generation and trans-
port solution (Economical Power Flow - EPF), normally
leads to the commitment of generators with lower opera-
tion cost to provide most of the consumer required power,
while the remaining power is provided by the less eﬃcient
generators [41]. This is actually just one of the possible
solutions to the generic dispatch problem (DP), that strives
to satisfy all the load with the available generators by
simultaneously fulfilling some target of interest.
Some restriction to the goal of maximum profit is
always present, since each constituent of the network
has safety working conditions beyond which it should not
be used [42]. When sudden fluctuation of load happens,
deviation from optimal dispatch can be exercised to avoid
overloading of grid elements; but after a while the most
economical working point under the new conditions is
wanted again. Economy and security seem to be antag-
onistic with each other. However, from the perspective
of BO propagation this trend claims to be verified since,
sometimes, eﬀorts made to reduce the risk of smaller
blackouts can increase the risk of large blackouts [18].
When using an EPF, nearly overloaded lines may exist
in the system even if the total power generated is relatively
low compared to the total transmission capacity of the
network. Therefore, even at low load levels, stressed
network elements may fail and trigger a BO of a not
necessarily little size. To reduce such kind of threatening
states, some variations in dispatching may be adopted:
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i. Deploy Distributed Generation (DG), i.e., providing
power sources closer to load nodes. This approach
basically tends to reduce criticalities due to trans-
mission grid. (If all loads were supplied by a
local generator, the grid lines wouldn’t be needed).
Advantages of DG in reducing BO has been explored
numerically in [8] by means of models similar to the
presented here.
ii. Try some uneconomical power dispatch (non-EPF)
having line integrity as major objective, i.e. a
rescheduling of power generated at each of the
centralized generators, typically at a higher cost
with respect to the minimum possible. Non-EPF
dispatch is expected to be an intermediate solution
between DG and EPF, from either economic and
robustness against BO performance standpoints.
Although such behavior sounds easy to accept, a
verification of this statement have not been made
before. Also, the numerical quantification done
here is worth, since BO processes could produce
unexpected results [18].
A comparison, between EPF and non-EPF is made
in the following sections in order to verify numerically
the mentioned supposition, and to evaluate the most
appropriate dispatch policy according to the loading state
of a grid. We explore how blackout sizes change when
power dispatching is done using diﬀerent policies. The
uncoupled DC models of IEEE power grids test cases 30,
57 and 118 are used to run the experiments, [43]. This
networks are portions of the USA power grid and among
others have been used as reference structures for many
48 ORIGINAL INDICES
years. The denomination "118" and "162" indicate the
number of buses, or nodes, of each of these networks.
To pre-assign the quantity of power produced by each
generator, a general nonlinear programming method as
explained in [44] is useful, since operational cost of gen-
erators are normally nonlinear functions. However, the
supposition of low complexity for generator cost functions
is made here, considering the situations in which linear
approximations are acceptable [45]. Further to that, the
simple "DC power flow method" ( [46], and section 1.3.3)
is employed, which is fully linear, and produces good
estimation of the active power flows going from generators
to loads. Due to this ability [47], DC model has been
used formerly in BO simulations as in [18], [48], [49], [50].
Hence, by taking these two assumptions regarding the
employed models, most of the power dispatching task can
be modeled as a linear programming problem.
In section 1.3.3 the linear relation used for modeling
the electric characteristics of grid and power flow, was
indicated in equation 1.7
F = MP
Among the entries of the vector P may be some 0’s
(corresponding to transmission nodes), some are fixed
(those corresponding to loads) and some are the actual
unknowns of our dispatch problem (the values of power
corresponding to generators). Based on this distinction
it is convenient to rewrite the linear relationship between
net powers and flows as
F = AL + BG (4.1)
where the matrices A and B contain proper combination
of topological structure and reactances of the grid, and
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give the eﬀect on the flows produced by loads L and by
generated powers G.
4.1.1 Dispatching and re-dispatching power
With the above notation, the solution of a DP amounts to
the solution of a linear or nonlinear programming problem
with a certain objective function and some constraints
that, starting from equation (4.1), define the network
topology and limitations.
Now, each generator is associated to a generation cost
ciGi , (i = 1, . . . , I ) by means of the unitary generation cost
ci so that
PI
i=1 ciGi is the total generation cost minimized
by straightforward EPF solutions.
A pre-requisite to comparison of diﬀerent dispatch
policies is the computation of the maximum energy that
can flow through the network. This will allow us to
qualify the stress to which the grid is subject in operating
conditions as the ratio between the total power actually
dispatched and such a maximum.
4.1.2 Transmission Capacity Estimation
The maximum grid transmission capacity is estimated by
solving
max
PJ
j=1 Lj
subject to
PI
i=1 Gi =
PJ
j=1 Lj
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
G  0
L  0
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where vector inequalities have to be read component-wise,
and the loads are taken as unknowns.
Since there is no bound on the amount of power
injected into the grid by the generators, the solution of
the above problem depends only on the capacities of the
lines listed in the vector C and tends to saturate all the
possible paths from generating nodes to load nodes.
The maximum of the objective function, Q, is assumed
to be the maximum total transfer capacity of the network
and is used to parameterize the level of stress to which it
is subject.
4.1.3 Building the reference case
Such a parameterization is done by considering load
configurations such that PJj=1 Lj = γQ with γ 2 [0,1]. To
simultaneously build the load configuration and associate
to it the most economical dispatch power, the following
linear programming problem is solved:
min
PI
i=1 ciGi
subject to
PI
i=1 Gi =
PJ
j=1 LjPJ
j=1 Lj = γQ
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
G  0
L  0
where both the vector G and the vector L are degrees
of freedom that are fixed by the optimizer in a feasible
configuration conforming to the chosen stress parameter
γ.
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Since we are interested in values of γ that are close to
1, feasible load configuration typically entail many non-
null entries and well represent highly-loaded grids.
4.1.4 Uneconomical Dispatching
With the same loads determined in the previous section
(and thus for the same stress level) a diﬀerent approach to
dispatching is used, which solves the following program-
ming problem:
min
PK
k=1 j FkCk j
subject to
PI
i=1 Gi =
PJ
j=1 Lj
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
G  0
Note that, in this case, the entries of the L vector are
not degrees of freedom and that generation cost is not
taken into account. Rather, the aim is making lines as far
as possible from their maximum capacity thus favoring
the use of alternative paths between the same pairs of
nodes and implicitly enhancing robustness with respect
to possible localized failures.
Despite the presence of an absolute value, the above
problem can be recast into a linear programming problem
by the classical method (see, e.g., [51]) of adding a further
variable vector X with the same size of F , adding the
constraints F  X ,  F  X , X  0, and minimizingPK
k=1 Xk.
The corresponding solution will be indicated as uneco-
nomical Linearly Penalized Power Flow (LPPF). A similar
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dispatch method can be sought by minimizing the sum-
mation of line flow, in absolute values, that is using jFk j
in place of jFk/Ck j to minimizePk
k=1 jFk j in the preceding programming problem.
Another dispatch policy, intended to emphasize fur-
ther that small flow values have to be preferred against
larger ones, can be thought using a second-order nonlin-
earity and making the dispatch problem equivalent to the
quadratic programming problem
min
PK
k=1

Fk
Ck
2
s.t.
PI
i=1 Gi =
PJ
j=1 Lj
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
G  0
The corresponding solution will be indicated as Quadrat-
ically Penalized Power Flow (QPPF).
4.1.5 Blackout simulation andmeasurement
To initiate a BO we trip a randomly selected grid line.
After each failure (let it be the initial or any subsequent
one) the matrices A and B, and F = AL + BG are
recomputed. If the new set of flows entails lines that
overcome their capacities, the highest flow line is tripped
and flows, recomputed.
If this cascaded tripping isolates the ı¯-th node with
either Lı¯ > 0 (a load) or with Gı¯ > 0 (a generator),
power unbalance takes place and we have to tackle it by
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means of either load shedding or generation re-dispatch
respectively.
• If Lı¯ > 0 then the total load decreases and the
dispatch problem is solved again with the previously
adopted strategy (EPF, LPPF, . . . ) and adding the
constraint jG   G0j  ϸ where G0 are values of the
powers injected into the grid previous to re-dispatch;
ϸ > 0 is a threshold accounting for the limited ability
of generators in following rapid transients.
• If Gı¯ > 0 then less power is available over the grid
and we must proceed with load shedding.
To minimize transients, the generators still injecting
power into the grid do not change their production
while we try to reduce the shedding of load. This is
achieved by solving the linear programming problem
max
PJ
j=1 Lj
s.t.
λ
PI
i=1
i,ı¯
G0i =
PJ
j=1 Lj
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
0  L  L0
0  λ  1
where G0 is the vector of pre-shedding generated
powers, L0 is the vector listing the pre-shedding load
levels, and λ is an additional variable whose final
value indicates whether the remaining power can be
distributed without causing the failure of a further
link. In fact, if the solution sets λ < 1, the power of
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the generators cannot be entirely distributed to the
loads without violating some capacity constraint. To
cope with this, the most loaded line is assumed to
have a failure and the load-shedding is repeated with
the new grid topology.
4.1.6 Results
For each considered value of γ a BO is initiated in each
line of the grid. Moreover, to prevent results from being
dependent on the unit generation costs, for each BO
starting point and γ, many simulations are carried out
with diﬀerent randomly drawn values for the cj 2(1,2),
to estimate average behaviors. The BO is allowed to
progress even if the grid becomes divided into sections.
Additionally, as we induce BOs and let them to propagate,
the generated powers and flows on lines must be recalcu-
lated inside the corresponding grid section, each time an
element is overloaded and disconnected. The simulations
show that, when some of the non-EPF dispatch is used,
the average total power loss due to a BO can be less
than when using only EPF. The figures show results of
simulations for "IEEE 57 Bus, Power System Test Case"
[43], using the proposed non-EPF methods on values of γ
from 0.65 to 0,975, (high BO threat), and 2500 diﬀerent
sets of random costs for each γ.
On figure 4.1 the average extra costs of operation of
each dispatching method are displayed, taking the cost
of operation at grid capacity as scale reference. This is
the increase in operation cost due to the adoption of a
non-EPF in routine conditions. Regrettably, total costs
associated to BO depend also on the eﬀectiveness of re-
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covery plan; which is a time dependent (after BO) variable
out of the modeling scope adopted. We concentrate here
in costs of generation previous to BO’s occurrence. Values
corresponding to EPF are taken as zero reference. This is
the cost we must incur to achieve more robustness, since
it is expected for some non-EPF methods a reduction of
BO-related losses.
Figure 4.2 shows the average power loss produced by
each dispatch method at the end of BO propagation. Grid
capacity has been taken as scale to measure the power
loss of each BO: the average values are calculated on
the results from all the lines and sets of random cj for
each γ. The averages obtained for EPF were taken as zero
reference, therefore the corresponding losses (of EPF) lay
on the horizontal axis of figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Average additional costs for non-EPF. The costs of
generation when using EPF are taken as the reference.
It is evident from figure 4.1 that non-EPFs are more
expensive than EPF, but method LPPF is cheaper than
QPPF. On the other hand, methods LPPF and QPPF show
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Figure 4.2: Average power loss due to a BO. Losses for BOs when
using EPF are taken as reference.
negative values of excess power loss, which is the major
result of the experiments.(i.e. Power losses for this two
dispatch methods are less than those for EPF, which
have been taken as reference). Conversely, the remainder
method, min(sum(|F|)), can produce power losses in
excess as well as excessive operation costs. Therefore,
this method is not recommended for utilization.
Comparison between LPPF and QPPF methods is not
clear from figure 4.2, although QPPF seems to have more
sensible eﬀects for greater values of γ. To decide this
question, a simple summation (integration) of each set
of values can serve, under the simple assumption that all
γ are equally probable over time. Summations of excess
BO power loss results equal to -0.45 for method LPPF and
-0.5 for method QPPF; whereas, summations of operation
excess costs is 0.07 for method LPPF and 0.12 for method
QPPL. Achieved reductions in BOs losses are almost the
same, while excess cost of QPPF method is clearly bigger
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than for LPPF.
4.1.7 Stress and Dispatch policies as new
indices
In this section, objective evidence was presented to
support a previously unproven statements: "Doing the
grid safer is also more expensive". The results show
that, eﬀectively, some non-EPF dispatch policies can
reduce mean BO sizes in comparison to EPF technique.
Simulations on others test systems (IEEE 30 bus, IEEE
118 bus) produce similar results, showing as preferable
the use of LPPF method for moderate γ and QPPF only for
higher values. It is true but the important point here is
having done comparisons directly against an algorithm of
dispatch which strives for reaching the point of minimum
cost. The number of constraint inside control algorithms,
joined to the complexity of the grid, don’t allow to take any
statement as true without some experimentation.
(More on this topic is addressed in chapter 5.1).
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4.2 Distributed Generation and BOs
In this section it is shown how outage shift factors (OSF)
can be used to define a synthetic indicator of node
importance in power grids. A simple OSF-based index is
used jointly with Electrical Betweenness to select power
sources locations in a distributed generation framework.
Simulation indicates that blackout rejection is non negli-
gibly enhanced by this combined approach.
4.2.1 Where to place DG?
Large generation units normally have a fixed site on a
power grid since early design stages; this is not the case
for medium and small sized generation equipment, which
mostly constitute DG (distributed generation). Where
to place this medium sized type of power generation in
a mature grid is not a trivial task, and is a topic of
major interest in modern electric markets [52]. Research
has mainly concentrated on reduction of power loss,
production costs, and enhancement of voltage stability in
distribution networks among others objectives; and less
interest have been seen on the eﬀects of DG over cascade
failures and BO. Intuitively DG must have a beneficial ef-
fect on transmission infrastructures [8] but, more detailed
analysis suggest that robustness of transmission grids
can be degraded, increasing the risk of large failures, with
increased distributed generation if not done carefully [53].
As DG is progressively taking a greater portion of the total
generation, its impact on BO is not to be neglected.
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4.2.2 Betweenness and shift factor combi-
nation
As mentioned in chapter 2, in order to protect grid’s
component from cascade failures a rather big number
of ideas, techniques and theoretical models has been
developed and are still under investigation, not only in
the area of power grids but also in complex systems and
communication networks. Among them, for example,
betweenness coeﬃcients have been defined to rank the
vulnerability of network components, and betweenness-
like coeﬃcients have been produced also for power grids
[36], [54], [35]. In [36] an Electric Betweenness (EB) was
defined for ranking lines and nodes from the standpoint
of security. Such EB definition, taken up in equation (4.2)
and (4.3), is built from a linearized DC model of the grid
(described in section 1.3.3), and is based on two properties
of transmission lines: maximum allowed power flows and
shift factors (SF).
EB are strongly dependent on the unabridged grid’s
structure (that is, the network characteristics before any
failure), and therefore post-contingency grid’s features
are ignored. On the other hand, outage shift factors
(OSFs) contain information about the after-contingency
grid’s structure, and so, the idea of using them to define
security indices conceptually independent from EB is very
appealing.
4.2.3 Method for DG site evaluation
DG site evaluation is addressed here by means of a simple
characterization of grid’s buses as points for generation
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placement, using a suitable combination of both EB
and OSF grid topological indices, and evaluating the
performance of the chosen buses via BO simulations. The
methodology used consists in taking the set of generation
buses as a degree of freedom, and changing its elements
depending on some simple combinations of the topological
indices. For each instance in those groups of buses
a loading state is established and cascade failures are
triggered. In real transmission grids large generation
centers (as nuclear, hydro, etc.) have fixed locations on
the network.
However, for the sake of letting the topological indices
to show freely their eﬀects, fixed generators or loads sites
are not included in the numerical experiments, permitting
all buses the possibility to host generation or load as
diﬀerent instances are tested.
4.2.4 Grid Electric Model
Here, the same models as in section 4.1 are used.
The electrical characteristics of the grid are taken into
consideration using the linear model for network, and the
DC power flow calculation method as described in section
1.3.3.
Those can be summarized by equation 1.7 (F = MP)
and equation 4.1 (F = AL + BG)
(Where M = fHg is the matrix of shift factors).
The matrices A and B contain proper combination of
columns of matrix H, and give the eﬀect on the line flows
produced by loads L and generated powers G separately.
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4.2.5 Power delivering
For the experiments carried out in this section, basically
the same methodology as in section 4.1.1 was employed
with some modifications.
Network’s Total Transmission Capacity
As in section 4.1.2, a pre-requisite to obtain comparable
loading states for each set of generation-consumer nodes,
transmission capacity, (Q) requires to be calculated. Also
to qualify the stress level (γ) to which the grid is subject
in operating conditions is used. Diﬀerent combinations
of supplied powers and loads should be comparable if
producing the same level of stress to the network. The
optimization problem to find the transmission capacity
has the same form as in section 4.1.2, plus the addition
of constraints corresponding to the "N-1" rule. Also the
algorithm was adapted to change easily the nodes being
generation, load or transmission.
maximize
PJ
j=1 Lj
subject to
PI
i=1 Gi =
PJ
j=1 Lj
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
G  0
L  0
”N   1” rule constraints
Regarding the N   1 security rule, we make the fol-
lowing assumption: if any single line fails, the generation
and load levels (not modified) would impose a new flow
regime (F 0) to the remaining lines. Being H 0, A0 and
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B0 the corresponding new matrices of shift factors, the
optimization problem must guarantee that the lines flows
do not overcome line capacities, that is: F 0 = A0L + B0G,
with jF 0j  C. Following this idea, N   1 rule constraints
are formed using the three groups of matrices F 0, A0,
and B0; each group formed by K matrices, each of this
corresponding to a grid without one of the K possible lines.
Flow Calculation, General Case
Each generator is associated to a generation cost ciGi (i =
1, . . . , N ) by means of the unitary generation cost ci so thatPN
i=1 ciGi is the total generation cost. To simultaneously
build the load configuration and associate to it the most
economically dispatched power, we solve the following
linear programming problem:
minimize
PI
i=1 ciGi
subject to
PN
i=1 Gi =
PJ
j=1 LjPJ
j=1 Lj = γQ
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
G  0
L  0
N   1 rule constraints
where both, the vector G and the vector L are degrees
of freedom that are fixed by the optimizer in a feasible
configuration according to the chosen γ. Since we are
interested in values of γ that are close to 1, feasible load
configurations typically entail many non-null entries and
well represent highly-loaded grids.
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4.2.6 Topological indices
Electric Betweenness
The Electric Betweenness coeﬃcient (EB) used here, was
inspired in betweenness centrality and the aim to consider
more realistically the way power flows in an electric grid.
It is defined in [36], as follows:
EB(v) =
1
2
X
gϸG
X
lϸL
T
X
kϸLv
jHglk j (4.2)
TClg = minkϸK
(Ck/jHglk j) (4.3)
where v is a generic bus, situated between a generation
bus g and a load node l; G is the set of all generation bus in
the grid and L the set of load buses. The quantity T is the
maximum power the grid would transport between bus g
and d without producing a line outage in the hypothetical
setup of g and d being the only buses with eﬀective input
and output power flow. Hglk is the shift factor (or power
transfer distribution factor) on line k with respect to bus
g, and taking bus l as reference. This can be obtained by
simple subtraction of elements g and l of row k of matrix
H. Lv is the set of lines adjacent to bus v, and is used
also in the definition of the next topological index.
Outage Shift Factor Index
When a transmission line m goes out of service in a
operating grid, the k-th line that is still working suﬀers a
change Fk in its power flow. Each of those flow changes
is almost proportional to the pre-contingency flow of the
lost line. The proportionality factors are the so called Line
Outage Shift Factors, LOSF.
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LOSFmk = Fk/Fk (4.4)
A way for calculating these LOSF as function of pre-
contingency power transfer distributions factors can be
seen in [55]. So, the k-th non-failing line has an outage
shift factor referenced to the fallen line m, LOSFmk , that
can be known just from the values of matrix H of the
unabridged network. Alternatively, we can say that each
linem has K 1 associated LOSFs indicating how big is its
influence over the other lines. To express such influence
the OSF_line index of a line m has been defined:
OSF_linem =
K 1X
k=1
LOSFmk (4.5)
and finally for each bus v in the grid, an OSF index has
been defined (simply denoted by OSF(v)) as the sum of the
OFS_line indexes of all its adjacent lines:
OSF (v) =
X
mϸLv
OSF_linem (4.6)
Other bus outage shift factors exist in the Literature. For
example the one shown in [46], was designed to consider
the loss of a generator, and its value is dependent on an
arbitrary selection of which of the remaining generator
would supply the lost power. On the other hand, the OSF
index in equation 4.6 is exclusively dependent on network
topology.
Blackout simulation and measurement
Before BO simulation, a state of load must be set on
the network, choosing generation, load and transmission
nodes, and a stress level. Cost associated with generation
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and loads are also renewed for each load state, as a way of
take into consideration variable consumer requirements.
To initiate a BO event, a first line is cut and taken
as a reference. After this trip, the network is still stable
since its load state was established fulfilling the N 1 rule.
So, a second line must be forced to outage if it is desired
to trigger any spreading perturbation. Since the stronger
influence of a failed element is normally on the nearest
components of the grid [20], we take the second failed
lines from those which are adjacent to the first failed one.
After each failure (let it be the two initial, or any
subsequent one) we re-compute the matrices A and B and
F = AL + BG. If the new set of flows entails lines that
overcome their capacity, the highest flow line is tripped,
and flows recomputed.
If this cascaded tripping isolates the ı¯-th node with
either Lı¯ > 0 (a load) or with Gı¯ > 0 (a generator),
power unbalance takes place and we have to tackle it by
means of either load shedding or generation re-dispatch
respectively.
• If Lı¯ > 0 then the total load decreases and the
dispatch problem is solved again adding the con-
straint jG G0j  ϸ where G0 are values of the powers
injected into the grid previous to re-dispatch; ϸ > 0
is a threshold accounting for the limited ability of
generators in following rapid transients.
• If Gı¯ > 0 then less power is available over the grid
and we must proceed with load shedding.
To minimize transients, the generators still injecting
power into the grid do not change their production
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while we try to reduce the shedding of load. This
is achieved by solving the linear programming prob-
lem:
max
PJ
j=1 Lj
subject to
λ
PI
i=1
i,ı¯
G0i =
PJ
j=1 Lj
F = AL + BG
jF j  C
0  L  L0
0  λ  1
where G0 is the vector of pre-shedding generated
powers, L0 is the vector listing the pre-shedding load
levels, and λ is an additional variable whose final
value indicates whether the remaining power can be
distributed without causing the failure of another
link. In fact, if the solution sets λ < 1, the power of
the generators cannot be entirely distributed to the
loads without violating some capacity constraints.
To cope with this, the most loaded line is assumed
to have a failure and the load-shedding is repeated
with the new grid topology.
4.2.7 Blackout measurement, and probability-
risk graph.
BO size is measured as the loss of supplied power once the
cascade of failures reaches to a stable point. Additionally,
to compare BO from diﬀerent load instances, BO sizes are
weighted by the transmission capacity of the grid loading
instance.
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The set of all relative sizes from diﬀerent BO have a
cumulative distribution probability (CDF) function, ac-
counting for the probability of a BO being less or equal
than a chosen value. Starting from this, the complemen-
tary CDF, (CCDF=1-CDF) can be eﬀectively employed to
assess the ability of grid rejecting significant-size BOs.
In fact, given a threshold value for the BO size it is the
probability that an event producing a loss exceeding that
threshold exists and, ultimately, how risky is a certain
grid configuration. Obviously, when plotting CCDFs
against the threshold, the lower the profile, the greater
the robustness of the grid.
Results
The basic idea of the experiments consist in changing
the position of generators and make an evaluation of the
vulnerability of the resulting grid. The selection of position
to insert generating and consuming buses onto the grid is
made based on the values of EB and OSF indices. No
fixed generator of load is taken into account. To calculate
electric betweenness of each bus v using equations (4.2)
and (4.3) all the others nodes are considered as possible
input and output points. That is, any of the others buses
can be in both sets, Ld and Gn.
The values of the two indices for the "IEEE 57 Bus,
Power System Test Case" [43], can be seen on figure
4.3. Also there are on the plot the median of OFS values
(vertical line) and of EB values (horizontal) line. Median
thresholds are used to conventionally separate low values
from high values of parameters. Note how points are
scattered in the EB-OSF plane with a correlation equal
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to .38, that allows to use the two indices approximately
independently.
After obtaining the two topological indices for all the
buses of the tested grids, three type of runs have been
carried out depending on the selection of nodes in which
generation units are allocated:
i. Input nodes selected using the values of just one of
the topologic indices, depending whether the index
value is above or below the median. In this way,
four diﬀerent sets of instances have been generated,
two for generators placed on nodes with a high value
index, namely: osf_H and eb_H; plus other two, for
nodes with lower values of the index: osf_L and eb_L.
ii. Input nodes selected using the four possible com-
bination of high or low values of the two indices,
namely: osf_H/eb_H, osf_H/eb_L, osf_L/eb_H and
osf_L/eb_L.
iii. Input placed randomly regardless the value of any
index, used as a control set to show network
behavior independent from the indices.
For each instance of generation and consuming nodes
a number of variable load conditions are considered by
taking random values for the generation cost, cj 2 (1,2).
After the loading conditions are established, a BO is
initiated in each line of the grid, and is allowed to progress
even if the grid becomes separated into sections. As
the intention is to show the performance of indices in
high stress situation, a fixed value of γ = .995 (high BO
threat) has been taken for all the instances. Additionally,
BOs are induced and let to propagate, and the generated
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Figure 4.3: Electric Betweenness vs. OSF index.
powers and flows on lines must be recalculated inside
the corresponding grid section, each time an element is
overloaded and disconnected.
The figures show results of simulations for "IEEE
57 system", and 1000 diﬀerent instances of nodes and
loading states, imposing 5 generation and 20 consuming
nodes for each instance.
Figure 4.4 shows results for the first type of runs.
Reading an abscissa (BO size %) on this graph, the corre-
sponding ordinate indicates the probability of occurrence
of BOs of size equal or greater than the abscissa. A higher
line indicates greater chances for big BOs. Clearly the best
positioned set of runs is L_eb, corresponding to generators
located on buses of low EB. Also, the eﬀect of EB is more
intense than OSF since the runs corresponding to this
last are closer to the control set.
However these conclusions must be completed with
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Figure 4.4: Risk-impact / Probability for the first sets of buses.
figure 4.5, which shows results from of the second type of
runs. Here, the seemingly scarce influence of OSF index
vanishes, showing a systematic eﬀect when combined with
EB. What can be observed is a net reduction of big BO
when generators are confined to one of the two set of nodes
with higher OSF index.
The best set of nodes to insert generators is the one
with high outage shift factors and low electric between-
ness (osf_H/eb_L).
4.2.8 OSF index usefulness
This new topological index (OSF), based on post-contingency
grid structure has the potential to enhance the selection
of generation placement from a BO size reduction point
of view. It works eﬀectively in conjunction with electrical
betweenness in identifying nodes that are best suited to
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Figure 4.5: Risk-impact / Probability for the second sets of
buses.
host generation devices.
(More on this topic is addressed in chapter 5.2).
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4.3 Combined Indices for Static Con-
tingency Analysis
4.3.1 Static Contingency Analysis (SCA)
Dynamical Robustness Analysis, and contingency analy-
sis (section 2.3) on power grids entails the consideration
of power flows, and constraints like capacities of lines,
generators and others grid’s components. This allows the
observation of some realistic eﬀects, as for example: when
a grid element failures its zone of influence can arrive to
distant location, not being limited to nearby components.
On the other hand, Static Robustness Analysis is
simpler, just because it takes into consideration only the
connectivity structure of the network. Static Analysis
serves to observe what happens to the network’s structure
when components are taken away one by one, and ignores
the dynamic changes in flows that could be produced
during normal operation. This simplification brings as a
positive feature the possibility of generalization of results
to all kind of networks sharing similar structure. In
this case, the failure of a component basically can only
influence its very next neighborhood. Despite not being
the best test to assess a power grid’s robustness, static
analysis can show a kind of minimal expected eﬀect of
failures over an entire system, and gives an general idea
about the robustness of this last.
European Power Grid (EPG)
Robustness behavior of networks having power law distri-
bution of its degree coeﬃcients, are known to present a
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strong dependence on whether the loss of nodes is done
randomly of selectively following their degree index.
Authors of [56] claim that this quality is observed also
in electric power grids, in particular for the European
Power Grid, even if this type of networks has not a power
law distribution, but an exponential one: P(k) = c e k/d,
(with d = 1.81 and c = .7 for the EPG.)
4.3.2 Static Robustness and SCA
SCA can be performed considering a sequence of nodes
to be taken apart from the grid, in principle one by one,
forming a sequence. Two ways of setting such sequences
of nodes has been considered, namely:
• RANDOM selection of nodes, which are considered
as representing accidental events perturbing the
network and...
• Selection of nodes depending on some topological
measure. This way of choosing the nodes is often
used to simulate intentional attacks to the networks
and, is therefore called "Selective Attack".
Authors of [56] performed static robustness analysis
on the EPG and its subnets, using random loss of nodes
as well as selective attacks following the degree index of
nodes, in descending order.
Here, in figure 4.6, the results of the two process
is shown, making evident the more strong eﬀect of the
"degree coeﬃcient" based attack. The variable on the
horizontal axis, f , is the fraction of nodes taken apart from
the network; and the variable on the vertical axis, S, is the
relative size of the principal network component after the
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failures, i.e. the ratio between the number of nodes of the
bigger remainder island and the original number of nodes
of the grid.
A thing to note from the figure is the presence of some
especial points for the sequences of "selective attacks". On
this points, a common value of S for all the sequences
is observed, (see Figure 4.7, for example at f=0.011,
0.019 and 0.044). This detail can be explained realizing
that: from the start of each sequence up to this especial
points, the fallen nodes contained in all the sequences
are exactly the same, corresponding to degree coeﬃcients
from the absolute maximum down to a specific value
belonging to the concentration points. For example for
f=0.011, all the nodes with k=13, 12...9 were suppressed
from the network, and the structure of the grid at this
point could not have more than a unique value for S
(=0.979). Between each pair of this special points, all the
nodes considered have exactly the same degree coeﬃcient.
So, many variations in the order in which those nodes
are eliminated from the network can be made without
altering the degree coeﬃcient ordering. This possibility
of choosing among the diﬀerent permutations of nodes
with the same degree index, is what allows the existence
of many sequences to be used for attacking the network.
The advantage of using degree coeﬃcient for atomizing
the network can be thought as follows: if a node with
high degree is taken apart from the grid, this implies a
bigger chance of separating islands associated to some of
its neighbors.
76 ORIGINAL INDICES
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
f
S
 
 
Selective attacks (50 series).
Average selective attack.
Random attacks (50 series).
Average random attack.
Figure 4.6: Static Tolerance against random and selective
attacks.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
f
S
 
 
Selective attack.
Average Selective attack.
Special points.
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Static Robustness and clustering coeﬃcient
If adjacent nodes to a reference one are interconnected
among each other, one can guess that a lesser isolation
of distant parts would be produced. But interconnection
between neighbors of a node calls for consideration of the
clustering coeﬃcient, (section 3.1.3). That is, if the cluster
coeﬃcient of a node is high, the isolation of its neighbors
would be weak once it is removed from the network. Also,
a low clustering coeﬃcient implies scarce interconnection
among the surrounding nodes, which give them a high
chance of getting separated if the reference node is taken
apart. Following this idea, a new experiment was carried
out using the clustering coeﬃcient to sort the nodes before
starting their elimination from the network. This time, the
best direction for ordering the nodes was the ascending
one.
A comparison of attacks using degree coeﬃcient and
clustering coeﬃcient is shown in Figure 4.8, where a
light superiority of the second sequences can be seen, (in
magenta).
Although for low f there is some superposition of
the outcomes from the two series of sorted sequences,
the average values is in general better for attacks using
the ascending cluster coeﬃcient order (red line). The
attacks using degree index displays a bigger variance and,
its average trend (visible as the blue line) is above the
corresponding to the clustering coeﬃcient.
78 ORIGINAL INDICES
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
f
S
 
 
Clust. coef. attacks.
Average c. coef. attack.
Degree index attacks.
Average deg. ind. attack.
Figure 4.8: Degree coeﬃcient vs. Clustering coeﬃcient, 150
sequences.
4.3.3 Static Robustness Analysis using a
Combination of Topological Indices
In the previous section the presence of many diﬀerent
sequences of nodes, all satisfying the same ordering re-
garding a topological coeﬃcient has been mentioned. This
various sequences show segments in which all nodes have
the same value for the topological coeﬃcient of interest.
At their time, those segments of the sequences are also
susceptible of being reordered, for example following a
diﬀerent topological coeﬃcient.
Static contingency analysis has been performed using
this double ordering for the EPG, using two diﬀerent types
of sequences:
• "A" Sequences of nodes: defined here as sequences
with a primary ordering according to the ascending
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EPG.
clustering coeﬃcient, plus an interior secondary
ordering following the degree coeﬃcient of nodes.
• "B" Sequences: defined as sequences with a primary
ordering following the descending degree index, plus
a secondary internal clustering-coeﬃcient ordering.
As the second (internal) ordering can be done in
ascending or descending direction, one instance in each
direction was done for both sequences types A and, B.
The outcome of the runs can be seen on Figure 4.9 where
also the average values from Figure 4.8 are included to be
serve as reference (dotted lines).
First to mention is that depending on whether the
internal ordering is done in the descending or ascending
direction, the results obtained after the attack shows a
clear diﬀerence in the vertical variable S in almost all the
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range of f . This is a clue indicating a real significance
or usefulness of internal ordering. The most interesting
directions of internal orderings, as could be expected,
are "ascending" for the clustering coeﬃcient inside type
B sequences (cyan line); and "descending" for the degree
coeﬃcient inside the type A sequence (magenta line). The
winner seem to be this last one, but it is convenient
to make a more objective evaluation. So, a comparison
with the sequences from the two previous sections, which
follow only a primary ordering, is shown in figure 4.10.
4.3.4 Measuring performance of Static Ro-
bustness Assessment
There are many "simple ordered" sequences to compare
with just one "double ordered". The measure of per-
formance presented here consist in counting how many
instances j among n sequences with simple clustering
coeﬃcient ordering (CCO) are worse than the type A
"interior descending" sequence (Ad). It is "worse" in the
sense of producing less damage to the network, that is a
higher S. This performance (PAd ) of the sequence Ad is
calculated as:
PAd(f ) = 1/n
nX
j
Ij
with Ij =
8>><>>: 1 if SCCO_j(f )   SAd(f )  00 otherwise
So, from Figure 4.10 in the zone of f 2 [0;0.043],
selective attack using the sequence of nodes Ad is better
or equal to more than a half (50%) of the CCO possible
instances. Sequence Ad is clearly advantageous, since
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Figure 4.10: Performance of selective attack using double
ordered sequence Ad for EPG.
it is surely good enough from a practical point of view:
the fraction of the network which is separated from the
principal component is around 34%. Any real power grid
loosing such a portion of its nodes is clearly in a major
blackout situation.
4.3.5 Results for other power networks
The satisfactory performance of applying sequence Ad to
selectively attack EPG, is clearly not a general result.
Since an analytical justification of the results is lack, at
least qualitative result on other networks is necessary in
order to not consider the method just a coincidence or a
quality of EPG. So, the method has been applied on the
"IEEE power system test cases 118, and 162 bus" [43].
Result for this two networks (shown on Figures 4.11
and 4.12) are compatible with those for EPG, indicating
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IEEE 118 and IEEE 162 when subject to selective attack with
sequences of nodes double ordered, "Ad".
the advantage of sequences like Ad (with primary ascend-
ing clustering-coeﬃcient ordering and, interior descend-
ing degree coeﬃcient ordering). From an attacker point of
view, taking apart from the network the double ordered
nodes is most of the times better than using sequences
ordered with just a single coeﬃcient.
4.3.6 Third level of ordering for Static Anal-
ysis realization
As the use of double ordering showed a significant
influence in the outcome of selective attacks, the idea of
introducing one further depth of ordering has emerged.
In this case, the third coeﬃcient considered was a kind of
"degree index of second level", calculated as the quantity
of nodes with distance equal to 2 from the reference one.
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Figure 4.12: Performance of selective attacks using node’s
sequences "Ad" for networks IEEE 118 and, IEEE 162.
Unfortunately, the sequences of nodes using this three-
deep ordering had no practical influence on the outcome
of S.
4.3.7 Usefulness of Combination of indices
for Static Robustness Analysis
The use of degree index had been adopted to explore the
static robustness of a power grid. Here, we have seen that
such technique of selective attack can be improved by the
use of clustering coeﬃcient in place of degree index and
further enhanced by applying an internal second depth
ordering, in descending direction, following the degree
index. This type of node ranking to implement selective
attacks probably is not suitable for networks with degree
distributions with insuﬃcient dispersion, as in the case of
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random networks. On the other hand, may be, it is worth
testing the idea on "power law network", which show some
dispersion in degree index.
(More on this topic is addressed in chapter 5.3).
Chapter
5 Discussion and
Conclusions
5.1 On stress and dispatch policies
In the section (4.1), objective evidence was presented to
support the simple statement: "Doing the grid safer is
also more expensive". Also, from a standpoint considering
"robustness indices" it can be said that in that section an
index for measuring the stress of the grid, γ, has been
defined using the transmission capacity as a reference.
Taking as a base the dispatch policies used, and com-
bining them with "stress", a qualitative estimation can
be expressed about how risky is the grid operation. A
strong quantitative indicator is lack, in part because a
more extensive sets of BO simulations should be carried
out first of being able to put that qualitative estimation as
a number.
When talking about BO, it is known that for example,
they are more likely to occur at certain times of the
year due to weather conditions. In a similar, but much
deterministic way, BOs are more likely to occur when
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using certain dispatch policies. The dispatch policies
seen in this thesis, have been evaluated statistically after
producing a set of simulated BOs. None of them provide
a single number telling how much risk of BO’s there is at
a given time; but each dispatch policy shows a strong
trend. This knowledge could be advantageously used
for automatic control systems to anticipate threatening
situations, or reduce BOs impact.
5.2 On OSF index
The new topological index, OSF, presented on section 4.2
works eﬀectively in conjunction with electrical between-
ness, EB, in identifying nodes that are best suited to
host generation devices. The experiments were carried
out supposing all buses free to accept generators. It is
expected that the enhancement in finding god nodes for
generation remain mostly unchanged in case of working
also with some fixed generators, even if the experiments
were carried out supposing no fixed one. This is stated
considering that the groups of nodes to run as generation
sites were selected randomly from some pool of candi-
dates. In the case of using some centralized generators,
the performance of combining OSF and EB index could
experiment some variation in intensity, but the general
tendency should keep on if excluding those nodes from
the candidate pools.
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5.3 On combination of indices for
Static Robustness Analysis
The static contingency analyses done in section 4.3 show
that the combination of degree index and clustering
coeﬃcient devised here can improve the selection of nodes
to realize a selective attack over a network. (Conversely,
the information provided is equally useful for defense
purposes).
Clustering and degree coeﬃcients are local topological
measures, which makes them relatively appealing for
being used by agents inside control areas of a grid. On
the other hand, this static contingency analysis is not so
well suited for power grids, since an electric system hardly
could withstand a quite big number of component failures
as used in the experiments. So, the applicability to power
grids is somehow limited, but in any case the technique
says something about the structural general robustness of
a network. The methodology applied here could serve for
comparing diﬀerent networks (of any type) and determine
which one is more resistant to attacks. The study also
can serve as a basis for defining other indices capable of
indicating robustness using attacks of lesser intensity.
5.4 Original Contribution
The indices shown in this thesis, on sections 4.1 and
4.2 ("Economical Dispatch and BOs" and "Distributed
Generation and BOs"), were presented as the following
two conference papers:
• "Power Grid Dispatch Policies and Robustness to
88 Discussion and Conclusions
Chain Failures", at 21st European Conference on
Circuit Theory and Design, September 2013. Dres-
den, Germany.
• "Combined Topological Indices for Distributed Gen-
eration Planning", at 5th Innovative Smart Grid
Technologies Conference, ISGT2014, February 2014.
Washington D.C. USA.
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Appendix
A Details of Power Flow
Methods
(Most of this appendix is from [46]).
The power flow problem consist basically in the determi-
nation of bus voltage, phase and line currents, allowing
the calculation of power flowing in each grid element.
Although , Supplied and consumed power at each bus
of the grid, are normally taken as boundary conditions
for the problem. As a power grid is simply an electric
network, being buses and lines the nodes and branches
respectively, the starting point to formulate a solution is
the matrix relation between voltages and current at each
node (bus) as in equation A.1:
2666666666666666666664
I1
I2
...
IN
3777777777777777777775
=
2666666666666664
Y11 Y12 . . . Y1N
...
...
YN1 YN2 . . . YNN
3777777777777775
2666666666666666666664
E1
E2
...
E4
3777777777777777777775
(A.1)
Where I and E are the vectors of current and voltages
on the N buses the network. "Y" is the admittance matrix
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for the network, having its elements the following rule of
formation:
• If a line exist from bus i to bus j
Yij =  yij
being yij the admittance of the line between nodes i
and j.
• And: Yii =
P
j yij + yig
with yig being the possible admittance from node
i to ground, and the index j going over all lines
connected to node i.
A.1 Gauss-Seidel method
Another important equation, is the one expressing the net
injection of power at a bus:
Pk   jQk
Ek
=
X
j=1,j,k
YjkEj + YkkEk (A.2)
This is taken as a base for applying the Gauss-Seidel
method and resolve bus voltages, and after them the
power flows. The basic expression for the Gauss-Seidel
method is then:
E(n)k =
1
Ykk
Pk   jQk
E(n 1)k
  1
Ykk
26666664X
j<k
YkjE
(n)
j +
X
j>k
YkjE
(n 1)
j
37777775 (A.3)
A.2 Newton-Raphson Method
For an single-valued-single-variable function S(x), the
Newton’s method involves the idea of an error being driven
to zero by making adjustments x to the independent
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variable associated with the function. Suppose we wish
to solve:
S = F (x)
In Newton’s method, we pick a starting value of x and call
it x0. The error, (ϸ), is the diﬀerence between S and a
linear approximation to it. Using the Tailor expansion for
the function about x0:
F (x0 + x) = F (x0) + F
0
(x0)x + ϸ
S = S(x0 + x)   S(x0)  F 0(x0)x
so, an approximation for x is
x  h = S(x0)
F 0 (x0)
(A.4)
And the solution for the initial equation, S = F (x), is
sought iteratively, changing the value of the independent
variable as:
h =
S(x (n))
F 0 (x (n))
(A.5)
x (n+1) = x (n)   h (A.6)
with (n) indicating the n   th iteration. The Newton-
Raphson method applied to power flow calculation uses
a Jacobian matrix in place of a first derivative, and as a
base the expression of the power injected to each bus:
Pi + jQi = Ei I

i
where
Ii =
NX
k=1
YikEk
and then
Pi + jQi = Ei(
NX
k=1
YikEk) (A.7)
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Pi + jQi = jEi j2Y ii +
X
k=1,k,i
Y ikEiE

k
As in the Gauss-Seidel method, a set of starting voltages
is used to get things going. The P + jQ calculated is
subtracted from the scheduled P + jQ at the bus, and the
resulting errors are stored in a vector. As shown in the
following, we will assume that the voltages are in polar
coordinates and that we are going to adjust each voltage
magnitude and phase angle as separate independent
variables. Note that at this point, two equations are
written for each bus: one for real power and one for
reactive power. For each bus we have:
Pi =
NX
k=1
∂Pi
∂k
k +
NX
k=1
∂Pi
∂jEk jjEk j
Qi =
NX
k=1
∂Qi
∂k
k +
NX
k=1
∂Qi
∂jEk jjEk j
All the terms can be arranged as follows
26666666666666666666666666664
P1
Q1
P2
Q2
...
37777777777777777777777777775
=
2666666666666664
∂P1
∂1
∂P1
∂jE1 j . . .
∂Q1
∂1
∂Q1
∂jE1 j . . .
...
...
...
3777777777777775|            {z            }
Jacobian Matrix
2666666666666664
1
jE1j
...
3777777777777775 (A.8)
The matrix in the right hand side, is the Jacobian matrix
for the network. This starts with the equation for the
real and reactive power at each bus. Remembering the
equation A.7:
Pi + jQi = Ei
NX
k=1
Y ikE

k
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which can be expanded as:
Pi + jQi = Ei
NX
k=1
jEi jjEk j(Gik   jBik)ϸj(i k )
=
NX
k1
fjEi jjEk j[Gik cos(i   k) + Bik sin(i   k)]
+jjEi jjEk j[Gik sin(i   k)   Bik cos(i   k)]g
where i , k are the phase angles at buses i and k,
respectively; jEi j and jEk j the bus voltage magnitudes
respectively; Gik + jBik = Yik is the ik term in the Y matrix
of the power system. The general practice in solving power
flows by Newton’s method has been to use jEi jjEi j , instead of
simply jEi j; this simplifies the equations. The derivatives
are:
∂Pi
∂k
= jEi jjEk j[Gik sin(i   k)   Bik cos(i   k)]
∂Pi
∂jEk j
jEk j
= jEi jjEk j[Gik cos(i   k) + Bik sin(i   k)]
∂Qi
∂k
=  jEi jjEk j[Gik cos(i   k) + Bik sin(i   k)]
∂Qi
∂jEk j
jEk j
= jEi jjEk j[Gik sin(i   k)   Bik cos(i   k)]
(A.9)
Equation A.8 now becomes:
26666666666666666666666666664
P1
Q1
P2
Q2
...
37777777777777777777777777775
=
h
J
i
26666666666666666666666666664
1
jE1 j
jE1 j
2
jE2 j
jE2 j
...
37777777777777777777777777775
(A.10)
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also... 26666666666666666666666666664
1
jE1 j
jE1 j
2
jE2 j
jE2 j
...
37777777777777777777777777775
=
h
J
i 1
26666666666666666666666666664
P1
Q1
P2
Q2
...
37777777777777777777777777775
(A.11)
So, as done using equations A.5 and A.6 in the case of
an single-valued function; for the power flow problem an
initial estimation is done for the independent variables E
and , and iterative updating thereof is made using the
 ’s given by equation A.11.
A.3 Decoupled Power Flow
Decoupled method consist in a simplification of the
Newton-Raphson method in order to avoid the burden
of resolving and inverting the Jacobian matrix en each
iteration.
Starting with the terms in the Jacobian matrix (equa-
tions A.9) the following simplifications are made:
• Neglect any interaction between Pi and any jEk j (it
was observed by power system engineers that real
power was little influenced by changes in voltage
magnitude). Then, all the derivatives ∂Pi∂jEk j
jEk j
will be
considered to be zero.
• Neglect any interaction between Qi and i , (a similar
observation to the above one was made on the insen-
sitivity of reactive power to changes in phase angle).
Then, all the derivatives ∂Qi∂k are also considered to
be zero.
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• Let cos(i   k)  1 which is a good approximation
since (i   k) is usually small.
• Assume that Gik sin(i   k) << Bik
• Assume that Qi << Bii jEi j2
This leaves the derivatives as:
∂Pi
∂k
=  jEi jjEk jBik (A.12)
∂Qi
( ∂jEk jEk )
=  jEi jjEk jBik (A.13)
If we now write the power flow adjustment equations as:
Pi =
∂Pi
∂k
k (A.14)
Qi =
∂Qi
( ∂jEk jjEk j )
jEk j
jEk j (A.15)
Then, substituting equations A.12 in A.14 and A.13 in
A.15 we obtain:
Pi =  jEi jjEi jBikk (A.16)
Qi =  jEi jjEi jBik jEk jjEk j (A.17)
Further simplification can then be made:
• Divide eqs. A.16 and A.17 by jEi j.
• Assume jEk j  1 in eq. A.16.
which results in:
Pi
jEi j =  Bikk (A.18)
Qi
jEi j =  BikjEk j (A.19)
And these lead to the following two matrix equations:
106 Details of Power Flow Methods
2666666666666664
P1
jE1 j
P2
jE2 j
...
3777777777777775 =
2666666666666664
 B11  B12 . . .
 B21  B22 . . .
...
3777777777777775
2666666666666664
j1j
j2j
...
3777777777777775 (A.20)
2666666666666664
Q1
jE1 j
Q2
jE2 j
...
3777777777777775 =
2666666666666664
 B11  B12 . . .
 B21  B22 . . .
...
3777777777777775
2666666666666664
jE1j
jE2j
...
3777777777777775 (A.21)
Note that both eqs. A.20 and A.21 use the same
matrix. Further simplification can be done in the P-
relationship of eq. A.20:
• Assume rik << xik; this changes  Bik to  1/xik.
• Eliminate all shunt reactances to ground.
• Eliminate all Shunt to ground which arise from
autotransformers.
Simplifying the Q-jEj relationship of eq. A.21:
•Omit all eﬀects from phase shift transformers. The
resulting equations are:2666666666666664
P1
jE1 j
P2
jE2 j
...
3777777777777775 =
h
B
0i
2666666666666664
1
2
...
3777777777777775 (A.22)
2666666666666664
Q1
jE1 j
Q2
jE2 j
...
3777777777777775 =
h
B
00i
2666666666666664
E1
E2
...
3777777777777775 (A.23)
where the terms in the matrices are:
B
0
ik =   1xik , assuming a branch from i to k (zero otherwise)
B
0
ii =
PN
k=1
1
xik
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B
00
ik =  Bik =   xikr2ik+x2ik
B
00
ik =
PN
k=1  Bik
As B0ik and B
00
ik are constants they can be calculated
once and no more updated, diﬀerent from what is required
for the Newton method.
————————————-
